A role mining inspired approach to representing user behaviour in ERP systems by Khan, Roheena et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
Khan, Roheena Q. and Corney, Malcolm W. and Clark, Andrew J. and Mohay, 
George M. (2009) A role mining inspired approach to representing user 
behaviour in ERP systems. In: Proceedings of The 10th Asia Pacific Industrial 
Engineering and Management Systems Conference, 14-16 December 2009, 
Kitakyushu International Conference Center, Kitakyushu. 
           
     ©  Copyright 2009 [please consult the authors] 
 ________________________________________ 
† : Corresponding Author 
 
A Role Mining Inspired Approach to Representing  
User Behaviour in ERP Systems 
 
Roheena Khan†1, Malcolm Corney2, Andrew Clark3, George Mohay4  
Information Security Institute 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane 4001, AUSTRALIA 
Email: r.khan@qut.edu.au1  
m.corney@qut.edu.au2 
a.clark@qut.edu.au3 
g.mohay@qut.edu.au4 
 
 
Abstract. Despite all attempts to prevent fraud, it continues to be a major threat to industry and government. 
Traditionally, organizations have focused on fraud prevention rather than detection, to combat fraud. In this 
paper we present a role mining inspired approach to represent user behaviour in Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) systems, primarily aimed at detecting opportunities to commit fraud or potentially suspicious 
activities. We have adapted an approach which uses set theory to create transaction profiles based on analysis 
of user activity records. Based on these transaction profiles, we propose a set of (1) anomaly types to detect 
potentially suspicious user behaviour and (2) scenarios to identify inadequate segregation of duties in an ERP 
environment. In addition, we present two algorithms to construct a directed acyclic graph to represent 
relationships between transaction profiles. Experiments were conducted using a real dataset obtained from a 
teaching environment and a demonstration dataset, both using SAP R/3, presently the most predominant ERP 
system. The results of this empirical research demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.  
 
Keywords: Fraud Detection, Role Mining, Anomaly Detection, Enterprise Resource Planning, Security, 
Policy inference, Audit trail analysis.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ERP systems are one of the most important IT 
developments to emerge in the 1990’s. More and more 
organizations are now adopting ERP systems, with most of 
the Fortune 1000 firms having installed ERP systems to run 
their businesses (Bingi, Sharma et al. 1999). An ERP 
system is a packaged software solution that aims to 
automate and integrate the core business processes of an 
organization. Whilst ERP systems provide numerous 
benefits to organizations, due to their nature they are 
vulnerable to many internal and external threats (Little and 
Best 2003).  
Since the advent of ERP systems, researchers have 
always focused on fraud prevention rather than fraud 
detection. Many recent publications have discussed fraud 
prevention approaches such as role-based access control, 
segregation of duties, encryption, username and passwords, 
etc in different systems (Musaji 2002; Little and Best 2003; 
O'Gara 2004). Although many organizations employ fraud 
prevention techniques, they only prevent simple kinds of 
fraud from occurring and are not enough on their own 
(Bolton and Hand 2002). Complex fraud schemes built 
over time, involving various applications, are difficult to 
prevent. Nevertheless only a few publications deal with 
fraud detection approaches in ERP systems (Albrecht, 
Albrecht et al. 2006; Best 2007). Another driver for better 
fraud detection particularly in ERP systems, is the shift 
towards service oriented architectures (SAP 2005). These 
architectures allow a higher degree of automation of 
business processes, which may lead to more cases of fraud 
as the number of human checks are reduced and the number 
of entry points into the system are increased (Clark, Mohay 
et al. 2005). 
Auditors and fraud examiners generally review audit 
logs to detect frauds in ERP systems, which is a labour-
intensive task requiring time, effort and resources (Wells 
2005). They need to have a good understanding of the 
business, ERP software and its features in order to conduct 
effective audits. As audits are conducted periodically 
generally once every financial year, fraud is only detected 
towards the end of the year. According to the KPMG fraud 
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survey (2006), the average time to detect fraud is 18 
months. Automated fraud detection approaches provide a 
possibility of real time fraud detection which can be 
conducted continuously therefore identifying frauds as soon 
as they are perpetrated and reducing the overall financial 
losses and time to detect fraud.  
ERP systems typically have role based access control 
over which permissions a user is allowed to perform. In 
addition to this, security policies assist in the segregation of 
related duties to reduce the opportunities to commit fraud. 
Many researchers have discussed the use of role mining 
techniques to automatically determine roles from existing 
permissions assigned to users within an organization 
(Sandhu, Coyne et al. 1996; Kuhlmann, Shohat et al. 2003; 
Schlegelmilch and Steffens 2005; Vaidya, Atluri et al. 2006; 
Zhang, Ramamohanarao et al. 2007). Role mining is the 
process of defining roles and their associated permissions. 
The current work has been motivated by role mining 
techniques, adapted to identify transaction profiles and so 
detect suspicious activities or anomalies and violations in 
segregation of duties with respect to the activities actually 
performed by users. We have also proposed a graphical 
representation depicting the relationships between 
transaction profiles. The intention is to identify activity 
which may be indicative of financial fraud.  
The next section describes the related work in the field. 
The paper follows with a discussion of the proposed 
approach, using transaction profiles, in Section 3. An 
articulation of the proposed scenarios for identifying 
inadequate segregation of duties and anomaly types for 
detecting anomalous behavior are presented in Sections 3.1 
and 3.2 respectively. Next, the generation and 
implementation of the directed acyclic graph, showing 
relationships between transaction profiles is described with 
the help of an example in Section 3.2.1. The experiments 
and a discussion of the results are presented in Section 4. 
The paper concludes with a brief discussion on the current 
work and future directions presented in Section 5. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
 
The motivation for this study stems from role mining 
approaches which generate roles from existing permissions 
assigned to users. We have adapted a role mining approach 
for generating transaction profiles from the user activities 
recorded in an ERP system. We have derived a set of 
anomaly types that flag potentially suspicious activities 
from these transaction profiles. We also detect scenarios 
that identify violations in proper segregation of duties from 
the transaction profiles, based on the principles presented in 
Little and Best (2003). The next subsections discuss the 
related work in the literature. 
2.1 Role Mining and Segregation of Duties 
 
Segregation of duty policies reduce the opportunities 
for fraud by ensuring that mutually exclusive roles must be 
invoked in order to complete a sensitive task (Kuhn 1997; 
Sandhu, Bhamidipati et al. 1999). If an individual has 
privileges to both authorize and execute transactions, it is 
possible for them to commit and cover fraud in their normal 
course of duties. Effective internal control structures 
require such privileges to be segregated at various levels 
within an organization. Weaknesses in segregation controls 
are common and often provide opportunities for fraud 
(KPMG 2008). Numerous guidelines and principles for the 
separation of duties have been proposed in the literature to 
prevent fraud (Srinidhi 1994; Haelst and Jansen 1997; 
Arens and Loebbecke 2000; Little and Best 2003). 
In an ERP system, where hundreds and thousands of 
users are performing activities, the only way to segregate 
duties is to assign roles and authorizations to users which 
would prevent them from performing incompatible 
combinations of transactions (Little and Best 2003). Role 
mining is the process of determining a set of roles that is 
complete and correct and to do so in an efficient manner 
(Coyne 1996). Synonyms of role mining include role 
engineering, role definition, role discovery, role finding and 
role characterization. Essentially there are two main 
approaches to role mining: (i) the top-down approach and 
(ii) the bottom-up approach.  Some authors have also 
discussed a combination of the two approaches, called a 
hybrid approach (Schaad, Moffett et al. 2001). In the top-
down approach, business processes are carefully examined 
to identify job functions and their associated roles. Top-
down approaches are mainly adopted by small enterprises 
where there are no existing roles or permissions assigned to 
individuals (Martin, Dalia et al. 2003). Though the 
approach identifies groups of users who perform similar 
activities accurately, it is a costly, time consuming and 
tedious process to understand the semantics of the business 
processes especially in large organisations with millions of 
authorizations and thousands of users (Vaidya, Atluri et al. 
2008). Detecting financial fraud is a labour-intensive task 
requiring time, effort and resources for internal and external 
auditors, and having to perform role mining using this 
approach would further extend the manual audit processes. 
On the other hand, the bottom-up approaches derive 
roles from existing permissions assigned to users, with 
minimal human intervention. Most studies in the literature 
have proposed bottom-up role mining techniques as they 
automate the process of role discovery and are therefore 
more cost effective (Zhang, Ramamohanarao et al. 2007).  
This approach is not likely to consider the business 
functions within an organization (Shin, Ahn et al. 2003). 
Schlegelmilch and Steffens (2005) present a bottom-
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up approach which uses hierarchical clustering to create a 
hierarchical tree of permissions and users which can be 
used to derive roles. Their algorithm first computes for 
each permission the number of users who have that 
permission and groups these users together in a cluster. In 
this initial step, each different permission is in its own 
cluster, meaning that each user may be a member of 
multiple clusters. Pairs of clusters are combined based on 
the maximal overlap of their user sets. Newly formed 
clusters contain the permissions of their child clusters and 
the set of users from the child clusters who have all 
permissions in this new cluster. The algorithm stops when 
no more clusters can be combined or when all permissions 
are combined into one root node. The algorithm does not 
derive roles, but a tree with users and permissions, although 
there is a discussion on manually deriving roles from the 
tree.   
Another bottom up approach, proposed by Vaidya et al. 
(2006) uses subset enumeration to derive roles from 
existing permissions. The algorithm intersects all possible 
combinations of permissions to derive roles. It starts by 
considering existing permissions assigned to users as roles, 
called initial roles. The intersections of these roles are then 
used to generate more roles, called generated roles.  
Further intersections of generated and initial roles are 
carried out until no new roles are generated (Vaidya, Atluri 
et al. 2006). Our implementation of this algorithm 
discovered that an enormous number of roles are generated 
and not surprisingly that some of these were not allocated 
to any users. We believe that this is impractical and time 
consuming for the auditor to detect anomalous activities.   
Compared to Vaidya et al. (2006) and Schlegelmilch 
and Steffens (2005) work, our approach is more similar to 
Schlegelmilch and Steffens (2005). In their study they have 
suggested roles that are derived from existing permissions 
assigned to users. While in our approach we use subset-
superset relationships to derive transaction profiles from 
the activities actually performed by users.  
 
2.2 Anomaly Detection and User Profiling 
 
Anomaly detection is a branch of intrusion detection. 
Typical anomaly detection systems profile the regular also 
called standard or normal behavior of a user, generally 
referred to as the training or profiling phase and any 
deviations from this standard behavior, known as the 
detection or use phase is indicated as a possible intrusion or 
anomaly (Lu 2006; Xu, Sung et al. 2007)). Once the 
deviations or anomalies are identified, the system generates 
an alert. Anomaly detection models are capable of adjusting 
their detectors to keep up with the changes in a user 
behavior to accurately detect suspicious behaviour (McCue 
2006). They are also capable of detecting novel frauds. 
Denning (1987) developed an intrusion-detection model 
that gathered information from various audit logs/records 
which generated profiles for users. These profiles are then 
compared with normal user activity and anomaly records 
are generated for deviations found. Also, activity logs were 
maintained to track actions if particular conditions were 
met. They could also be used for updating profiles and 
generating reports (Denning 1987). Anomaly detection 
systems are generally accepted, but are expensive in terms 
of overhead, as they keep track of profiles and updates 
(Kruegel and Vigna 2003) and sometimes identify unusable 
but legitimate behavior as fraudulent, therefore generating a 
high rate of false alarms (Yang, Binxing et al. 2007). 
 
3. THE APPROACH: USE OF TRANSACTION 
PROFILES 
 
In this section we discuss our three main contributions. 
We have adapted a role mining approach for deriving 
transaction profiles. We use the term, transaction profile, 
TP, to denote a set of distinct transaction types that one or 
more users have performed. A transaction profile may be 
associated with one or many users and each user is 
associated with exactly one transaction profile. Our work 
uses information recorded in security audit logs which 
record the transactions performed by the users of the 
system. ERP systems generally have role based control 
over which transactions a user is allowed to perform. Users 
are assigned one or many roles and they are allowed to 
perform any transactions in those roles, but different 
policies may mandate only one role at a time.  
Problems can occur when a user changes their job 
function or are promoted, meaning that they are assigned a 
new role or set of roles but their previous roles are not 
revoked (Schlegelmilch and Steffens 2005). This 
accumulation of roles cannot be avoided in some cases 
when an organization has only a small number of 
employees and these employees must take on many roles.  
Often in small organizations role segregation is difficult 
and users have more permissions than they require (Little 
and Best 2003). These situations can provide the 
opportunity for fraudulent activities when a user has access 
to roles that allow them to carry out all transactions 
required for those fraudulent activities. As an example, a 
user may have the necessary role permissions to create a 
vendor and to create orders and invoices for that vendor. 
Even though a user has access to all transactions in 
their assigned roles, they may not use all of them.  
Therefore, two users who have the same roles assigned in 
the system may have quite different transaction profiles 
based on the transactions that they actually use. In our work, 
we ignore roles and focus on the actual transactions that 
users perform as recorded in the ERP security audit logs.   
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We now describe our approach to detecting transaction 
profiles which represent potential fraud situations; 
situations which represent inadequate segregation of duties 
or user activity which is anomalous.  
 
3.1 Detecting Inadequate Segregation of Duties 
 
We aim to detect users whose transaction profile 
contains conflicting or incompatible transactions that 
violate the principles of segregation of duties. We 
implement and test our approach using the theoretical 
framework for separation of duties presented by Little and 
Best (2003). They propose the following set of seven 
principles for General Ledger (GL), Accounts Receivable 
(AR) and Accounts Payable (AP) applications of an ERP 
system:  
(i) Users who are given the authorizations to create and edit 
master records should not be able to enter transactions.  
(ii) Credit management activities and master record 
maintenance should be separate in AR.  
(iii) Credit management and dunning functions must be 
segregated from invoice and receipt data entry.  
(iv) Receipt data entry should be separate from credit 
memo and invoice data entry.  
(v) In AP, cheques and payments must be performed by 
someone who is not entering vendor invoices.  
(vi) Writing off AR as a bad debt must be segregated from 
receipt data entry.  
(vii) User activities between GL, AP and AR should not 
cross boundaries. 
We detect scenarios based on these principles to 
identify inadequate segregation of duties from transaction 
profiles discovered by processing the security audit log. 
The idea is to identify users whose transaction profiles have 
provided the opportunity to commit fraud. 
 
3.2 Detecting Anomalous Activities 
 
We aim to detect users whose transaction profiles are 
anomalous when compared to other users, based on 
differences in transaction profiles discovered from 
processing the security audit log. We use the following 
types and notation: 
u : a user_id 
t : a transaction type 
tp : a user transaction profile – a set of 
transaction_types 
ug : the set of users associated with a particular tp 
UG : the set of all ug’s 
U : the user set - the set of all user_ids 
TP : the set of all unique tp’s 
 
Anomaly Type 1. The idea behind this anomaly type is to 
detect a small group of users who behave slightly 
differently to a large group of users by performing some 
small number of additional transaction types. The number 
of additional transaction types used to detect this anomaly 
type is set as a threshold value, ∆trans, e.g. three extra 
transaction types, and the difference in the number of users 
with the two transaction profiles is likewise set as some 
threshold, ∆users, e.g., the small group could be one-tenth 
of the number of users in the large group. The detection of 
transaction profiles of interest tpi can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Find tpi ∈ TP, ∀ tpj ∈ TP | tpi ≠ tpj  ∧  tpj ⊆ tpi  ∧  |ugi| 
< |ugj|/∆users  ∧  |tpi| - |tpj| < ∆trans      (1) 
 
Anomaly Type 2. We aim to detect transaction profiles 
which have a large number of transactions that are being 
performed by a small number of users. For example: users 
may have accumulated many roles over the course of their 
employment in an organization. The number of users can 
be set with some threshold value, ∆users and the number of 
transactions can be set with another threshold value, ∆trans. 
These transaction profiles may represent the administrators 
of the system which would mean that the transaction 
profiles are not anomalous. The user threshold value could 
be set based on the known number of system administrators 
to reduce the number of false positives. This can be 
expressed as follows (note that the thresholds ∆users and 
∆trans have a different significance here than in Anomaly 
type 1): 
 
Find tpi ∈ TP| |ugi| < ∆users  ∧  |tpi| > ∆trans      (2) 
 
Anomaly Type 3. A third type of anomaly detection is 
proposed which will detect transaction profiles which are 
completely separate from all other transaction profiles i.e. 
transaction profiles where none of the transaction types in 
the transaction profile can be found in any other transaction 
profile. Users having these transaction profiles could be 
interesting to locate, simply because they share no 
transaction types with other users. The number of users 
with such a transaction profile is expected to be low. 
 
Find tpi ∈ TP, ∀ tpk ∈ TP | tpi ≠ tpk ∧ tpi ∩ tpk = { }   (3) 
 
Discussion. It may be noticed that detection of these 
anomaly types relies on set relations between transaction 
profiles. The transaction profiles of interest in Anomaly 
type 1 have a transaction set which is a slight superset of a 
transaction profile which is used by a large number of users.  
Anomaly type 2 may arise because the set of transactions in 
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the transaction profile of interest is the superset of 
transaction sets of multiple other transaction profiles.  
Anomaly type 3 may occur when the transaction profile has 
a unique transaction set i.e. the transaction profile has no 
transaction supersets or subsets. 
We propose to use a directed acyclic graph of 
transaction profiles to represent the subset – superset 
relationships. Directed edges connect transaction profiles 
from a parent vertex to a child vertex where the transaction 
type set in the parent is a proper subset of those in the child.  
A graph built from transaction profiles may have multiple 
roots. These root vertices will be transaction profiles with 
unique transaction sets, probably with a small number of 
transactions. Internal and leaf vertices in the graph may 
have one or many parent vertices. There may be vertices in 
the graph which are not connected at all and these will 
relate to Anomaly type 3 above. 
When the graph has been built, it can be traversed to 
detect the anomaly types discussed above and flag possibly 
fraudulent transaction profiles and their users. We suggest 
that it is necessary to have security audit log data from a 
system for a long period of time in order to reduce the 
number of false positives that the anomaly types may 
generate. 
 
3.2.1 Generating the Transaction Profile Graph 
 
Our approach uses set theory to profile user activities 
recorded in ERP security audit log files. Given a set of 
users and transaction types, in an ERP security log, our 
algorithm progresses in three phases as follows: 
(1) User-transaction mapping: We firstly traverse the ERP 
security audit log, to map users to a set of transaction types 
that they have performed. For each user, a user-to-
transaction type set mapping is generated.  
 
Algorithm 1. Transaction profile generation  
1. TP ← {} 
2. UG ← {} 
3. for each ui ∈ U do 
4.  tpi ← get_tp(ui) 
5.  if tpi ∈ TP then 
6.   ugi ← get_ug(tpi) 
7.   ugi ← ugi ∪ ui 
8.  else 
9.   TP ← TP ∪ tpi 
10.   ugi ← {ui } 
11.  end if 
12. end for 
 
(2) Transaction profile generation: We next generate a set, 
TP, of unique transaction profiles from the user-to-
transaction type set mappings, ui → tpi. Each distinct set of 
transaction types represents a transaction profile, tpi. Users 
who have the same transaction profile are grouped into a 
set ugi, associated with that transaction profile. We have a 
mapping from users to their transaction profiles: 
 get_tp : u → tp 
and a mapping from transaction profiles to the set of 
users associated with that transaction profile: 
 get_ug : tp → ug. 
The process of generating transaction profiles is presented 
in Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 2. Deriving the transaction profile graph 
Require: TP from Algorithm 1 
1. G = (V, E)  
2. V ← {tpØ} 
3. E ← { } 
4. for x = 1 to max(|tpi|) do   
5.     for each tpi ∈ TP| |tpi| = x    
6.         for each tpg ∈ V 
7.           if tpg ⊆ tpi  then  
8.           E ← E ∪ (tpg, tpi)   
9.            end if 
10.       end for 
11.       V ← V ∪ tpi   
12.      end for 
13. end for 
14. for x = max (|tpi|) to 1 do 
15.     for each tpi ∈ V| |tpi| = x  
16.         for each tpj ∈ V| tpi ⊆ tpj    
17.           for each tpg ∈ V| tpg ≠ tpi ∧ tpg ≠ tpj         
18.     if tpg ⊆ tpj ∧ tpg ⊆ tpi then   
19.       E ← E - (tpg, tpj)   
20.                end if 
21.               end for 
22.           end for 
23.      end for 
24. end for                  
 
(3) Deriving the transaction profile graph: A directed 
acyclic graph, G, is generated by this phase of the 
algorithm which has a set of directed edges, E, and a set of 
vertices, V, which represent the transaction profiles 
generated in Phase 2. A directed edge is connected from 
one transaction profile to another if the transaction set of 
the former is a proper subset of the transaction set of the 
latter. The final graph has a further restriction that a 
transaction profile will not have direct edges to a vertex 
which is a descendant of one of its children as these are 
redundant. The process of deriving the directed acyclic 
graph is presented in Algorithm 2. 
The graph is initialized with a special null transaction 
profile, tpØ, which has an empty transaction set (Steps 1 to 
3 of Algorithm 2). This root vertex therefore acts as a 
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parent for all transaction profile vertices that are added to 
the graph because it is a proper subset of all other 
transaction profiles and is present only for simplifying 
graph generation. This root vertex is ignored in all further 
calculations once the graph has been generated. 
The remainder of the transaction profiles are added to 
the graph in order of the cardinality of the transaction set, 
|tpi|, in the transaction profile. Each transaction profile is 
tested to determine if transaction profiles currently in the 
graph have transaction sets that are proper subsets of the 
current transaction profile’s transaction set. If the subset 
relationship is discovered, an edge from the parent 
transaction profile in the graph to the current child 
transaction profile is added to the set of edges (Steps 4 to 
13 of Algorithm 2). 
Once a full pass of transaction profiles has been made, 
redundant edges as mentioned above are removed. This is 
done by starting at the leaves of the graph and moving back 
to the root vertex of the graph checking for such edges 
(Steps 14 to 24 of Algorithm 2). There are more efficient 
algorithms in the literature for determining subset 
enumeration (Haixun, Hao et al. 2006) but our approach 
runs in polynomial time, O(n3). 
An example. Suppose an ERP security audit log of an 
organization consists of six users (u1…u6) each of whom 
have executed a subset of five transactions (t1…t5) during a 
certain period of time. In Phase 1 of our approach, a user-
to-transaction type set mapping is generated for each user 
(see Table 1 below). Each distinct set of transaction types 
represent a transaction profile. It can be observed from 
Table 1 that users u1 and u4 perform the exact same set of 
transactions, meaning that they will belong to the same   
  
Table 1: User transaction mapping. 
 
U T 
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 
u1 0 0 1 0 0 
u2 0 0 0 1 0 
u3 0 0 1 1 0 
u4 0 0 1 0 0 
u5 1 0 1 0 0 
u6 0 1 0 0 1 
 
Table 2: Transaction profiles and user sets. 
 
Transaction profiles tp ug 
tp1 {t3} {u1, u4} 
tp2 {t4} {u2} 
tp3 {t3, t4} {u3} 
tp4 {t1, t3} {u5} 
tp5 {t2, t5} {u6} 
transaction profile. Table 2 shows the transaction profiles, 
tp and ug generated by Phase 2 of our approach. We then 
add transaction profiles as vertices in the graph based on 
the relationship between the sets of transaction types in the 
transaction profiles. As tp1 and tp2 have the lowest number 
of transaction types in this example, they become the root 
vertices (depicted in Figure 1). We then continue to work 
through the remaining transaction profiles. Transaction 
profile tp3 has transactions t3 and t4, making tp3 a child 
vertex of tp1 and tp2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of a directed acyclic graph and an 
isolated vertex. 
 
As transaction profile tp5 does not have any 
transaction types that have subset-superset relationships 
with transaction types in other profiles, it is represented as 
an isolated vertex. The remainder of the vertex 
relationships can be seen in the final graph generated by 
our approach as shown in Figure 1. 
 
4. EVALUATION 
 
This section describes the experiments conducted to 
validate the proposed approach. Two different datasets have 
been extracted from ERP systems to detect anomalies and 
inadequate segregation of duties. In the following 
subsections we describe the datasets, implementation and 
experimental results.   
 
4.1 Dataset 
 
Data from ERP systems, more specifically SAP R/3 
systems were extracted for evaluating the approach. SAP 
R/3 is an integrated ERP system which offers modules for 
the various business functions in an organization. It has its 
own set of master records and configuration tables. Each 
user needs to enter a client number, a username and a 
password while logging on to the SAP system. After 
successfully logging in, each user accesses the same main 
menu for accounting, logistics, human resources as well as 
the security administration and configuration functions. 
User roles and authorizations restrict user access to 
individual functions (which are identified using transaction 
codes) (Best 2006). Typically a transaction code comprises 
four or more alphanumeric characters that uniquely identify 
an activity. For example the transaction code to create a 
vendor invoice is represented as FB60. A user can only log  
 
(tp2 = {t4}) (tp1 = {t3}) 
(tp3 = {t3, t4}) (tp4= {t1, t3}) (tp5 = {t2, t5})  
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Table 3: Extract from SAP R/3 security audit log. 
 
 
on if a user master record with a password for that user has 
been created in the system. The scope of activity of each 
user in the system is defined in the user master record by 
one or many roles. The user authorizations, roles, type and 
personal data such as the address are recorded in the user 
master record (SAP 2007). 
The security audit logs are stored in a binary format 
and can only be extracted using the reporting facility. 
Filters are used to define which events may be recorded in 
the logs. Information is only recorded in the audit files if 
the audit logs are turned on. An extract from the SAP R/3 
security audit log is depicted in Table 3 above. It contains 
fields for the date and time of the user activity, client id, 
user id, transaction code, terminal name, message number 
and message text. The message number and message text 
fields of the log provide more details about the transaction 
performed. Some activities in the SAP system do not have 
specific transaction codes, such as logon, logoff and 
running RFC calls. These activities are represented by 
session_manager or no transaction code. These particular 
transaction codes on their own do not add any value to a 
transaction profile and therefore have been excluded from 
our experiments. Their inclusion to build richer transaction 
profiles with other information stored in system tables 
and/or the security audit logs, such as in (Best, Rikhardsson 
et al. 2009), is currently being studied and will be 
addressed in the future work, discussed in Section 5. Table 
4 shows a summary of the datasets, excluding transactions 
session_manager or no transaction code and the users 
associated with only these two transaction types.  
 
Table 4: Summary of the experimental datasets. 
 
N
o 
Datasets Total 
records 
Period  
of 
extraction 
Total 
users 
Total 
transa
-ction 
types 
1 University dataset 60,988 
12 
months 202 584 
2 Demonstrat
-ion dataset 304,126 6 days 39 183 
 
The two different datasets that have been extracted 
from the SAP system for evaluating our approach are: (i) a 
dataset hosted by our university for teaching purposes and 
(ii) a demonstration or training dataset used for testing the 
different business functions within an organization. Dataset 
1 consists of 60,988 records of real activities performed by 
administrators, instructors and students over a period of 12 
months. Student activities are based on tutorial exercises 
conducted during two semesters. Amongst the 490 users in 
Dataset 1, only 202 users had transaction codes recorded 
against their names. These 202 users have executed 584 
different types of transactions (shown in Table 4). On the 
other hand, Dataset 2 is a demonstration environment that 
is accessible to SAP customers from different organizations 
for learning and training on the SAP system. It consists of 
304,126 records performed by 106 users. Only 39 users had 
transaction codes recorded against their names. Data was 
extracted over a period of 6 days in which users performed 
183 different types of transactions. As Datasets 1 and 2 are 
extracted from a student and a demonstration dataset, any 
anomaly types or inadequate segregation of duties 
scenarios identified do not represent fraudulent behavior 
but demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.  
 
4.2 Implementation 
 
Algorithms 1 and 2 have been implemented in Java 
and the results of the experiments are stored in a MySQL 
database. Figure 2 describes the implementation process of 
the proposed approach. The security audit log and the user 
master records are exported to text files from the options 
available in the SAP R/3 system’s user interface. As all user 
activities are recorded in the security audit log, even when 
a user fails to logon to the system due to a mistyped 
username, the activity is recorded. A user can only log on 
successfully if a user master record for that particular user 
is present in the system. In the first step, the audit log file is 
filtered to exclude invalid user ids by checking if the user 
name exists in the user master record. Also to protect the 
Figure 2: Implementation of the approach. 
Date Time Cl. User Transaction code Terminal MNo Text 
17.03.2008 11:54:32 600 233-063 EC01 fitgp-s623-206 AU3 Transaction EC01 Started 
17.03.2008 11:54:32 600 233-063 EC01 fitgp-s623-206 AUW Report RSECOP01 Started 
17.03.2008 11:54:32 600 233-002 FB50 fitgp-s527-017 AU3 Transaction FB50 Started 
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confidentiality of the data, the username and the terminal id 
fields of the log are anonymized. The filtered and 
anonymized text file is then used as input for Algorithm 1. 
For each user in the text file, a user-to-transaction type set 
mapping is generated to create transaction profiles, which 
are required as input for Algorithm 2. Algorithm 2 then 
builds a directed acyclic graph based on the subset 
relationships between these transaction profiles. The 
parent-child vertex information from the directed acyclic 
graph is then stored into the database (depicted in Figure 2). 
Alerts or red flags are identified by running a set of SQL 
queries constructed for the various anomaly types and 
scenarios. The queries produce standard reports providing 
details of the red flags such as the transaction profiles, day 
and time of the activity, the anonymized users assigned to 
that transaction profile and the transaction codes executed.  
 
4.3 Experimental Results 
 
Once the datasets have been filtered and anonymized 
the algorithms generate a collection of directed acyclic 
graphs which would assist an auditor to visualize the 
different groupings of transaction profiles in the dataset. 
Each visually disaggregated graph or grouping of 
transaction profiles contains related activities. In Dataset 1, 
the processing generated 9 disaggregated graphs with a 
total of 200 distinct transaction profiles. Table 5 shows the 
9 disaggregated graphs or clusters, the depth of each graph 
and the number of transaction profiles and users in each 
graph. In order to give the reader an idea of the visual depth 
of each grouping or cluster of transaction profiles, we have 
included in Table 5 values for the number of levels in the 
graph. It can be observed that in Dataset 1 there are 4 
graphs that have one or more levels and 5 graphs with no 
levels i.e. these 5 graphs consist of single vertices. As a 
user can only belong to one transaction profile, there is no 
overlap between users in different transaction profiles. It 
can be observed from Table 5, row one, that most users, 
that is 179 out of 202 in Dataset 1 belong to related 
transaction profiles. Also, all transaction profiles have one 
user each except two transaction profiles (in row one and 
two) which have two users each.  
 
Table 5: Groupings of disaggregated graphs in Dataset 1. 
 
Number of 
disaggregat
-ed graphs 
Depth of 
each graph 
(in levels) 
Number 
of tp’s in 
graph 
Number 
of users in 
graph 
1 4 178 179 
1 1 2 3 
1 1 10 10 
1 1 5 5 
5 0 1 1 
In Dataset 2 the processing generated 4 disjoint graphs 
with a total of 39 distinct transaction profiles. Table 6 
shows a summary of the number of transaction profiles and 
users in each disaggregated graph. It can be observed that 
each transaction profile has only one user. As this dataset 
has lesser users and transaction types compared to Dataset 
1, there are small groupings of transaction profiles. In Table 
6, row four, it can be observed that there are 23 transaction 
profiles that do not have any connecting edges and are 
relatively different from the transaction profiles present in 
other directed acyclic graphs in Dataset 2.  
  
Table 6: Groupings of disaggregated graphs in Dataset 2. 
 
Number of 
disaggregate
-ed graphs 
Depth of 
each graph 
(in levels) 
Number 
of tp’s in 
graph 
Number 
of users in 
graph 
1 1 3 3 
1 1 2 2 
1 3 11 11 
23 0 1 1 
 
The next subsections discuss the anomaly types and 
inadequate segregation of duties scenarios detected from 
these transaction profiles.  
 
4.3.1 Detecting Inadequate Segregation of Duties  
 
This section describes the results of the inadequate 
segregation of duties scenarios discussed in Section 3.1. 
The inadequate segregation of duties framework was 
presented by Little and Best (2003), but was not 
implemented or tested. We implement the seven principles 
as scenarios to detect transaction profiles that contain 
incompatible transactions and thus find the users who are 
assigned these transaction profiles. Table 7 shows the 
principle number, the exact number of matches found, the 
number of transaction profiles that contain incompatible 
transaction types and the number of users assigned to those 
transaction profiles in Dataset 1. Segregation violations are 
detected using SQL queries and reports are generated for 
any matches found. 
Principle 1 was split into (a), (b) and (c) for separation 
of data entry and master records for GL, AP and AR 
respectively. For Dataset 1, Table 7 shows that for principle 
1(a) two transaction profiles, with one user each, have 
privileges to enter and post GL transactions, and create, 
change and delete GL master records in the system. It can 
be observed that the processing found most matches (69 in 
total) for scenario 7 which is segregation of transaction 
types across the GL, AP and AR activities. The separation 
of duties in scenario 7 is necessary to provide a check 
against AR and AP through GL control accounts and to 
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properly authorize the offsetting transactions between AR 
and AP. 11 users in the dataset can perform transactions in 
all three functions. Principles 1 (b), 2, 3 and 6 are not 
present in Table 7 as no students have preformed the 
incompatible set of transaction types present in these 
scenarios. 
 
Table 7: Results of detecting inadequate segregation of 
duties in Dataset 1 
 
Principle 
number 
Number 
of 
matches 
Number of 
transaction 
profiles 
Number 
of 
users 
1(a) 3 2 2 
1(c) 30 15 15 
4 12 6 6 
5 1 1 1 
7 69 11 11 
    
The scenarios focus on detecting potentially fraudulent 
activities within the financial module of the SAP system 
and therefore the transaction types included in the scenarios 
are all related to financial activities such as changing bank 
details, creating invoices and making payments. The 
queries did not find any transaction profile which contains 
conflicting or incompatible transaction types that violate 
the principles of segregation of duties in Dataset 2. This has 
been verified by manually checking the types of 
transactions present in the dataset. Most users in Dataset 2 
have conducted activities related to the sales and 
manufacturing module. 
 
4.3.2 Detecting Anomalies  
 
In this section, we discuss the results of the three 
anomaly types described in Section 3.2. The user and 
transaction threshold values for the anomaly types depend 
on a number of factors such as the size of the organization, 
the size of the dataset and the period for which the data has 
been extracted. Anomaly type 1 aims to detect a small 
group of users who have performed some additional 
transaction types compared to a large group of users. To see 
the effects of the variable transaction threshold values, we 
analyze the results by keeping the user threshold value 
steady. Table 8 shows the number of alerts generated for 
Anomaly type 1 in Dataset 1, for 6 different transaction 
threshold values and a steady user threshold value of 1.  
If the user threshold value is set to a value higher than 
1, no alerts are generated because all 202 transaction 
profiles are assigned to one user each, except two 
transaction profiles which include two users. The queries 
generate different number of alerts based on the transaction 
threshold value. It can be observed that the higher the 
threshold value the higher the number of alerts. No further 
alerts are generated if the transaction threshold value is 
greater than 55 (shown in the last row of Table 8). This 
implies that the maximum difference in number of 
transaction types between two transaction profiles is less 
than or equal to 55 (more details presented in Table 9). Our 
results for Anomaly type 1 are restricted as Dataset 1 has 
only one user in each transaction profile, except two 
transaction profiles which have two users each.  
 
Table 8: Results for different transaction threshold values 
of Anomaly type 1 in Dataset 1.  
 
Transaction 
threshold value 
User threshold 
value 
Number 
of alerts 
5 1 2 
15 1 5 
25 1 11 
35 1 20 
45 1 27 
55 1 30 
 
Table 9 presents a sample of the results (i.e. 4 out of 
30 alerts) when the transaction threshold value is set to 55. 
It shows the number of users and the transaction types in 
the parent and child vertex. The four transaction profiles or 
child vertices shown in Table 9 have the same transaction 
profile as their parent vertex. It might be interesting for an 
auditor to investigate why the users in the child vertices 
have performed many more transactions than the users in 
parent vertex. The 4 alerts presented in Table 9 are the 
extremes, the other 26 alerts generated from the processing 
are interesting too but the difference in the cardinality of 
the transaction profiles is lesser i.e. between 8 and 40 
transaction types. As this anomaly type depends on the 
number of users in each transaction profile, for Dataset 2, 
no alerts were generated as each of the 39 transaction 
profiles has one user assigned to them. 
 
Table 9: A sample of results for Anomaly type 1 in Dataset 1 
if the transaction threshold value is set to 55. 
 
No. of 
users 
assigned 
to parent 
vertex  
No. of 
transaction 
types in 
parent 
vertex 
No. of 
users 
assigned 
to child 
vertex  
No. of 
transacti
on types 
in child 
vertex 
2 4 1 57 
2 4 1 54 
2 4 1 55 
2 4 1 50 
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Anomaly type 2 aims to detect transaction profiles 
which have a large number of transactions that are assigned 
to a very small number of users. Table 10 shows the 
number of alerts generated for the different transaction 
threshold values for a steady user threshold value. For 
Dataset 1, the user threshold value was set to a value of 2 or 
less as each transaction profile consists of one or two users.  
 
Table 10: Results for different transaction threshold values 
of Anomaly type 2 in Dataset 1.  
 
Transaction 
threshold value 
User threshold 
value 
Number 
of alerts 
180 2 1 
160 2 1 
140 2 2 
120 2 2 
100 2 2 
 
When the transaction threshold value was set to 100, 120 or 
140, the processing generated the same two alerts, which 
include: (1) one user who has performed 194 transaction 
types and (2) a user who has performed 142 transaction 
types (shown in Table 10). When the transaction threshold 
value was set to a higher value, i.e. 160 or 180, the 
processing flagged the transaction profile with one user 
who has performed 194 transaction types. These alerts 
indicate potentially fraudulent user behavior and have been 
successfully identified by the anomaly definition. After 
manual analysis of the dataset, we found that both these 
transaction profiles with 194 and 142 transaction types are 
assigned to an instructor and a system administrator at our 
university.  
 
Table 11: Results of Anomaly type 2 in Dataset 2 with a 
fixed user threshold value. 
 
Transaction 
threshold value 
User threshold 
value 
Number 
of alerts 
20 1 4 
30 1 1 
40 1 1 
    
In Dataset 2, the user threshold value was set to a 
steady value of 1 as all transaction profiles have one user 
each. As Dataset 2 (see Table 11 for results) has less users 
and transaction types when compared with Dataset 1, if the 
transaction threshold value was set to a value higher than 
40, no alerts were generated. The query generated the same 
alert when the transaction threshold value was set to 30 or 
40. This alert may represent an anomaly as no users have 
performed more than 27 transaction types, except one user 
who has performed 48 different transaction types. This user 
might be an administrator or an instructor who may have 
tested all the training activities before the trainees 
performed them.  
 
Table 12: Results of Anomaly type 3 in Dataset 1 and 2 
 
Dataset 
Number 
of isolated 
vertices 
Lowest 
number of 
transactions/ 
profile 
Highest 
number of 
transactions/ 
profile 
Dataset 1 5 2 37 
Dataset 2 23 1 25 
 
Anomaly type 3 detects cases where the set of 
transaction types in the profile are not present in any other 
transaction profile. Table 12 shows the number of isolated 
vertices (i.e. the transaction profiles that do not have any 
edges connecting them) and the highest and lowest number 
of transaction types in a transaction profile, for both 
Datasets 1 and 2. It can be observed from Table 12 that in 
Dataset 1, the cardinality of transaction types for the 5 
isolated vertices is between 2 and 37. For an auditor, it is 
interesting to investigate a user who has performed 37 
different transaction types which no other user in the 
system has performed. Similarly, in Dataset 2 the highest 
number of transaction types in a profile is 25 and these are 
not performed by any other user in the system. 
For both datasets, the lowest number of transaction 
types in a profile is values of 1 or 2. It might be interesting 
for an auditor to investigate these users as they have only 
executed one or two transaction types in the system during 
the period for which the data has been extracted. These 
users might be valid users who have left the organization, 
been on leave or perhaps changed their user id in the 
system. Or they might be synthetic user ids created by valid 
users to perform fraudulent activities.   
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper we have presented three main 
contributions:  
(1) we have adapted a role mining approach for generating  
transaction profiles from the user activities recorded in the 
security log of an ERP system, and for identifying subset 
relationships amongst such transaction profiles, 
(2) we have postulated a number of anomalous, possibly 
fraudulent, activity scenarios which can be detected using 
the transaction profiles, and we have identified such 
anomalies in our non-synthetic datasets, and 
(3) we have implemented scenarios that identify violations 
in proper segregation of duties and have detected such 
violations using the transaction profiles generated in (1). 
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Our future work will focus on the detailed analysis of 
transactions involving session_manager and transactions 
where no transaction code is listed. This may in fact be a 
rich source of further information as it provides – in the 
case of the SAP software – detailed text message 
information qualifying the transaction in some fashion.  
The further step we intend is to incorporate frequency 
analysis into the anomaly detection. At the moment, our 
transaction profiles are based on transaction types only 
without regard for the number of times a particular type of 
transaction has been executed. This will naturally affect 
both the nature of transaction profiles and also the 
processing involved. It will provide the benefit of being 
able to detect much more subtle difference – possibly 
anomalies – amongst users. 
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